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offer windows of opportunity to improve the engineering
of closed-loop devices, making design choices (e.g., fully
automated AP versus an AP that allows some input from
the user) that would be informed by a contextual under-
standing of agency and identity.
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Relational Agency: Yes—But How Far?
Vulnerability and the Moral Self
Nicolae Morar, University of Oregon
Joshua August Skorburg, University of Oregon
Goering, Klein, Dougherty, and Widge (2017) have
done an important service in bringing feminist philo-
sophical theories of self, identity, autonomy, and
agency into a meaningful dialogue with the bioethical
debates surrounding the next generation of therapeutic
neuroprosthetics. We share many of the theoretical
commitments expressed by the authors, and we are
broadly sympathetic to their project (Morar and Skor-
burg 2016; Beever and Morar 2016; Kelly and Morar
2016; Alfano and Skorburg 2017). We agree that rela-
tional models provide powerful theoretical frameworks
for understanding the many ways in which agents
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opportunistically incorporate features of the external
environment (including props, tools, other people, etc.)
to bolster their capabilities. Still, we perceive two signif-
icant shortcomings in their argument: (1) the authors
fail to properly highlight the sense of vulnerability
entailed by their view of relational agency and (2) the
authors do not fully appreciate the potential threats to
personal identity entailed by their view. We unpack
each of these worries in an effort to strengthen the
authors’ argument.
RELATIONAL AGENCY ANDMORAL VULNERABILITY
With respect to (1), we first want to make explicit an argu-
mentative structure that is left largely implicit in the arti-
cle. To illustrate, consider the authors’ claim: “Just as our
friends may be supporting or controlling of our agency, so
too can neural devices be enhancing or threatening to our
agency” (67). Roughly, the argument form is as follows:
X and Y are—by a coarse-grained functional description—
similar, so if X is morally permissible, then Y, owing to the
relevant functional parity, should be similarly morally
permissible.
We contend that it is irresponsible to make this infer-
ence from functional parity to moral permissibility without
acknowledging the profound sense of vulnerability
required to get the argument from functional parity off the
ground in the first place. We worry that the authors have
not fully appreciated the cost at which their relational
view is purchased. That is, any relational conception of
agency or autonomy creates as much of a possibility for
empowerment as disempowerment. To say that friends or
prosthetics can scaffold and enhance our autonomy is to
acknowledge that autonomy is fundamentally porous
(Beever and Morar 2016). However, a responsible bioethi-
cal analysis must strive to articulate the full complexity of
the concept of vulnerability and the ways in which it tracks
not only our physical needs as a function of our embodi-
ment (e.g., openness to injury, disability, etc.), but also our
emotional and psychological vulnerability to others (e.g.,
lack of care, rejection, humiliation) and our social vulnera-
bility to exploitation, manipulation, and oppression
(Mackenzie, Rogers, and Dodds 2014; Straehle 2016).
By virtue of this openness and vulnerability, support-
ive, caring friends and well-designed prosthetics can yield
highly desirable outcomes and boost our agential capaci-
ties. Indeed, Klein et al. (2016) report that many patients
undergoing deep brain stimulation (DBS) for depression
describe opportunities to experience a more authentic self
and a wider range of feelings. One participant in their
study reports, “I still like the same things. I don’t have,
like, different values or anything. I just enjoy things more.
I’m me without depression” (144). The moral permissibil-
ity of such procedures, however, cannot be evaluated
solely in light of successful outcomes without understand-
ing the ways in which these very outcomes are underwrit-
ten by a view of the self as vulnerable—that is, open to
modulation by DBS. This very same openness, after all,
leads another participant to report feeling artificial: “I’ve
begun to wonder what’s me and what’s the depression,
and what’s the stimulator” (144).
We worry, then, that the authors have not fully
acknowledged the connection between relationality and
vulnerability: the very same features that enable the thera-
peutic, autonomy-enhancing benefits of DBS also render
the agent vulnerable to nontherapeutic and autonomy-
undermining harms. The concept of relationality is not a
magic bullet, and its potential benefits must be carefully
weighed against the potential harms it enables. When the
issue is the moral permissibility of next-generation DBS
devices, we think that the vulnerability of the agent is not
a mere corollary of a metaphysical claim about individuals
and autonomy, but rather, as many feminist bioethicists
have insisted, the very locus of the debate. Moreover, the
moral permissibility for such devices should never be eval-
uated with respect to a single variable (e.g., physical
empowerment) but always in relation to the complex con-
stellation of vulnerability including potential psychologi-
cal and social disempowerment. To ignore the role of
vulnerability in the present context is to ignore what is at
once most promising and most troubling about closed-
loop DBS implants.
DBS AND THE MORAL SELF
With respect to (2), we are similarly worried that the
authors have not seriously appreciated the difficulties
of their preferred view of personal identity, especially
when it comes to potentially altering a central piece of
who we are: our moral self. The authors appeal to a
loose-knit family of philosophical theories of identity,
variously described as relational, dynamic, and narra-
tive. The thread that ties them together is a kind of
anti-essentialism about personal identity, exemplified in
the authors’ claims that “perhaps that vision of an
essential self is itself suspect,” and “we don’t have
essential traits (without which we would no longer be)”
(62). These views surely have their own merits (and we
are particularly sensitive in our work to these merits),
not the least of which is their role in the argument
from functional parity: if personal identity is always in
flux, then the changes to personal identity from DBS
might not be all that different from the changes to per-
sonal identity encountered in everyday social
interactions.
We contend, however, that these anti-essentialist views
face a potential challenge from some recent work in experi-
mental moral psychology (Strohminger and Nichols 2014;
2015; Heiphetz, Strohminger, and Young 2016) that sug-
gests there are indeed some features of the self which are
perceived to be more “necessary”—and not merely more
stable—than others. In a number of studies across a variety
of contexts, Strohminger and colleagues have shown that
one’s morality or one’s set of moral beliefs is consistently
perceived as more identity-conferring than things like
one’s memories, preferences, or desires. In other words,
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changes to one’s moral compass (e.g., from a generous to
stingy disposition, or from racist to egalitarian beliefs) are
perceived to be the most disruptive to personal identity.
To be clear, our claim is emphatically not that such experi-
mental work reveals the ontological basis of personal iden-
tity. It is doubtful that any empirical evidence could do
that. Instead, our claim is that insofar as relational and nar-
rative views claim that perceptions of the self by others are
constitutive of personal identity, then this research on the
essential moral self does reveal aspects of personal identity
that are particularly relevant to the present debate. If
closed-loop DBS poses a threat to personal identity, this
threat will be amplified when aspects of the moral self are
at stake. We thus disagree with the authors’ contention
that there is a “difficulty in ascertaining what would
indeed constitute a threat to identity” (62). The robust
research on the essential moral self offers a highly plausi-
ble criterion for what counts as a threat to personal iden-
tity: if changes to the moral self are seen as particularly
disruptive to personal identity, then it is precisely undue
changes in this domain that we should be most worried
about.
In general (though they are writing in the context of
neurodegenerative disease), we concur with Strohminger
and Nichols that “future therapies ought to be aimed at-
and take into account-preserving moral function, a previ-
ously unappreciated factor in the well-being of patients
and their families” (2015, 1477, emphasis ours). More spe-
cifically, we think that studies like those described by Klein
et al. (2016) would do well to include survey items about
potential changes to the moral self.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
By way of conclusion, we believe the two shortcomings
we have identified also hint at directions for future
work. Recall the case, drawn from Klein et al. (2016), of
the participant who attended a funeral after having her
open-loop DBS device programmed. While the authors
couch this case in debates about agency, we believe it
actually reveals the importance of taking seriously the
psychological dimension of vulnerability described in
our first section and the threat to the moral self
described in our second section. After all, feeling the
right emotions, in the right degree, for the right amount
of time, and so on, is a crucial aspect of anyone’s moral
life.
We believe that any future conversation about the epi-
stemic and moral benefits of relational conceptions of
humanity (that helps us understand how human beings
can reliably integrate external resources into their own
agency) must be predicated on the two aspects this view
entails: empowerment and vulnerability, and the various
trade-offs between the complex variables that inform a
more comprehensive sense of our human fragility.&
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